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Property rights regimes and the 
management of resources 
Mehmet Bac 
The property rights regime is an important link between the yield of a natural resource and the appro- 
priation and maintenance incentives of its users. This paper discusses the theoretical background for this 
link and provides insights as to the function of the property rights regime, drawing from recent develop- 
ments in the economics literature on optimal ownership patterns and the theory of repeated games. The 
performances of different resource ownership patterns are evaluated using the criterion of economic 
efficiency. The economic theory of property rights is based on the idea that, because contractual arrange- 
ments are bound to be incomplete, there is scope for opportunistic behaviour and therefore the resulting 
resource management is likely to be inefficient. Optimal resource ownership patterns are viewed as 
solutions to the problem of structuring private users’ incentives in accordance with the socially desirable 
management of resources. 0 I998 United Nations. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved 
Society interacts with nature through technology, and in 
particular its institutions, the rules and conventions used 
for governing behaviour. The design of institutions or 
property rights regimes that are in tune with the functions 
of the underlying ecosystem is a fundamental concern in 
successful and sustainable management of natural 
resources. The allocation of property rights for alternative 
uses of a natural resource has important income distribution, 
efficiency, economic and environmental consequences. This 
paper presents several aspects of what is currently known of 
the interaction between communities and natural resources 
under different property rights regimes, and how that 
interaction may affect the performance of the resource 
systems. 
The theoretical results presented in this paper draw sub- 
stantially on recent developments in the economics 
literature on property rights. In order to make the presenta- 
tion accessible to the non-specialist and given the technical 
nature of this documentation, most of the supporting tech- 
nical evidence or detail has been omitted and the reader is 
referred to the literature in question. From the economic 
viewpoint, a stock of natural resources is a productive 
asset, which depreciates if overused and which has to be 
maintained and managed efficiently in order to generate 
the highest yield. The property rights regime is important 
to the successful management of the resource, as it 
influences the motivations of those who exercise these rights 
or work with the resources. 
The property rights regime may be imposed by the 
government or by local authorities, or it may be developed 
historically and enforced as a communal norm. Changes in 
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the fundamental ‘parameters’ of a natural resource (i .e.  its 
yield, intensity and predictability) may generate changes 
in the property rights regime. For instance, a territorial 
management system can become a looser, communal 
arrangement if resource use becomes less intensive. It can 
degenerate into an open-access system if local common 
property institutions cease to function, say, due to govern- 
ment intervention. Berkes (1989) provides a concrete 
example in his study of the hunting rights system of the 
native Indians in James Bay in sub-arctic Canada, where the 
ownership regime originally involved communal territories. 
Subsequently, as the use of the resource (mainly beaver) 
intensified following the development of the fur trade, 
a system of family-controlled territories evolved. 
Competition among fur companies and the incursion of 
outsiders into the area caused these local institutions to 
become eroded and finally lost. 
A striking feature of the vast empirical literature studying 
the link between property rights regimes and economic per- 
formance is the sheer diversity of property rights regimes, 
especially in those resource management systems. that are 
historically rooted. For example, in the reef and lagoon 
tenure systems of Oceania there is a diverse array of 
arrangements that changes from island group to island 
group (Ruddle and Akimichi, 1984; Johannes, 1978). Com- 
pared to this diversity, resource management prescriptions 
of the West are rather uniform in nature. To accommodate 
environmental and social perturbations, the task should be 
to make institutional arrangements more diverse, and the 
management of the resource more flexible not less. It is 
therefore an essential research objective to improve our 
understanding of the performance of property rights regimes 
in relation to natural resource and communal attributes. 
The criterion used in this paper to assess the ‘success’ in 
natural resources management is efficiency. Sustainability 
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and efficiency are distinct concepts. A resource manage- 
ment pattern may be efficient, but fail to satisfy a sustain- 
ability criterion. Roughly, resource use X is said to be more 
efficient than resource use Y if it is possible to make a 
number of individuals better off without harming the rest 
of the community by switching from resource use Y to 
resource use X. Under certain technical assumptions, this 
definition is equivalent to saying that the total economic 
surplus generated for the community under resource use X 
is larger than under resource use Y.’ Often, many efficient 
uses of natural resources coexist and the choice involves 
inevitable welfare trade-offs between social groups 
(landlords and peasants, rural people and industrial 
groups), and trade-offs between present and future genera- 
tions. A clearly defined and operationalized concept of 
sustainability may be of help in resolving these trade-offs. 
However, efficiency has priority: we must first tackle the 
problem of maximizing the size of the cake given the 
ingredients, before discussing how it should be distributed 
between present and future generations and between the poor 
and the rich within the present generation. To the extent 
possible, we must separate income/welfare distribution 
concerns from efficiency concerns. 
The following two sections of this paper are devoted, 
respectively, to a definition of property rights regimes and 
a discussion of incentive consequences. The subsequent 
section focuses on a special and controversial property 
rights regime that is often observed in rural communities: 
the local commons. A popular proposition, the Hardin 
(1968) “tragedy of commons”, is not a very good charac- 
terization of what really happens in many commons cases. 
Much of the cornqons literature instead suggests a ‘bucket 
brigade’ metaphor.- Given a resource management problem, 
a group of people will organize themselves and allocate 
property rights in  a way that is similar to the formation of 
a bucket brigade to put out the fire in a rural community. The 
tragedy of the commons arises only if the link between the 
management regime and the resource users is destabilized 
by a shock, such as technological innovations, government 
intervention or sharp fluctuations in the commercial yield of 
the resource. The theory of repeated games provides 
insights, summarized below, as to when a stabilizing 
feedback is present and when i t  niay deteriorate. 
Property rights regimes: definition 
This section provides a definition and classification of 
property rights. It also prepares the ground for the next 
‘The most important technical assumption is that the utilities of individuals 
be ‘quasilinear’ (see Mas-Colell et al.. 1995). The second definition of 
efficiency which relies on the measurement of total surplus is much 
more operational than the first, because it is almost impossible that a 
structural change as important as a switch in the ownership regime 
hams no one in the society while improving the welfare ot certain 
individuals. However, i f  the gains outweight the losses, that is, if the 
total surplus for the community increases as a result of the change in the 
ownership regime, i t  will be possible to compensate the losers for their 
losses and yet leave the winners with a positive surplus. The regime 
switch will enhance efficiency provided that the losers can be 
compensated. 
’Some of this literature is captured and interpreted in a series of volumes by 
the National Research Council (1986). McCay and Acheson (1987). 
Ostrom et 31. (1988). Stevenson (1991). and Bromley (1992). These 
volumcs account for only a fraction of the writings on this subject. 
section, which discusses the determinants of property rights 
regimes and their implications for renewable resource 
management. 
Why should the efficient management of a resource or 
asset be affected by the distribution of property rights per- 
taining to the various uses of the resource? What does it 
mean to own a natural resource. such as a piece of land or 
a flow of water? It is very useful to view a resource not 
simply as an object, but rather as a collection of rights, 
each of which can be separately owned by, or transferred 
to, different individuals or groups. What rights can be asso- 
ciated with, say, a 4 ha maple forest? This is a composite 
resource, which promises a stream of future goods and 
services. It can be used consumptively, e.g. for physical 
construction works, it can be sold or leased, or it can be 
spatially divided into territories. By analyzing the rights 
attached to the uses and services of a natural resource, one 
can separate its ownership into, for example, the right to 
graze in the forest for 20 years, the right to revenues from 
tourism and recreational services, and the right to collect 
and commercialize specific food items such as mushrooms 
or maple syrup. Some of these services and associated rights 
may be in conflict, and hence may not be exercised simul- 
taneously. Some are simultaneously exercised, as by, for 
example, an international paper company which manages its 
forest resources for both wildlife and timber, or as in the 
Huerta system in Valencia (Spain) which forbids the separa- 
tion of water rights from the land being used. Negative or 
positive externalities may stipulate a coordinated exercise of 
the various rights associated with a resource. 
The list of rights to all potential goods and services that 
can be produced from a natural resource, and the circum- 
stances under which the corresponding user rights can be 
exercised can be extended indefinitely, but it is bound to 
remain incomplete, due to uncertainty, lack of knowledge, 
limitations of the human intellect and the time needed to 
conceive such a list. Moreover, property rights must‘be 
enforceable; otherwise they cannot be transferred nor 
exercised. These facts have profound implications for the 
ownership structure: there will be a party (the government, 
an individual or group of individuals) who owns all the 
rights except those that are restricted by law or conferred 
to other parties through contracts. That is, there will be an 
owncr of residual rights who, in accordance with the recent 
theory developed by Grossman, Hart and Moore (see 
Grossman and Hart, 1986 and Hart and Moore, 1990) is 
simply called ‘the owner’. The criterion of efficient manage- 
ment o r  the resource determines who this owner should be, 
and what rights should efficiently be conferred. to whom 
through contractual relationships. 
The above definition of ownership is adopted here, and 
reference is made to the mechanisms for allocating these 
rights to natural resources as property rights regimes. 
Since natural resources can provide a large number of 
services, property rights regimes are likely to be diverse 
and complex. This article distinguishes between open access 
regime, government ownership of the resource base, and 
private ownership of the resource base. 
Open access regime 
Property rights in this rather extreme case are simply not 
allocated. Rights belong to no one; hence the resource is 
Property rights regimes and management of resources: M. Bac 265 
open to all. An open access regime can be efficient only if 
the ‘shadow price’ of the resource is zero, that is, if there is 
no social cost of extracting or using a marginal unit of the 
resource. This requires that the resource stock be quite large 
relative to the size and needs of the community, admittedly 
a rather hypothetical case in the present world context. 
Government ownership of the resource base 
The owner (of residual rights) under this regime is the 
government, which represents the general public. The 
government may contract out specific user rights to private 
individuals or firms. This type of mixed regime is some- 
times referred to as hybrid ownership and the resulting 
management is called co-management (see, for instance, 
de Camino Veloso, 1987, Jentoft, 1989, Ruddle, 1989 and 
Pomeroy, 1994 for case studies on the workings and 
performance of co-management systems). An example of 
co-management would be the private management of a 
national forest by a firm for 20 years, where all remaining 
rights belong to the government. The private management 
may, of course, be subject to regulation. 
Private ownership of the resoiirce base 
Under private ownership, the owners of residual rights are 
private individuals. The regime may display a hierarchical 
structure of property rights allocations, as the owners may 
contract out specific user rights to other private individuals. 
(A common term for contracting out specific rights asso- 
ciated with the land resources, such as the rights to access 
and manage, is tenancy.) An example of a private ownership 
system is a local fishery holding all the rights over the fish 
resources in a small lake. Each fisherman in the group may 
enjoy these rights subject to the informal rules and norms set 
forth by the group of owners, and the formal rules set forth 
by law. Here, two opposite private ownership regimes 
comes to mind-one where the resource is co-owned, and 
one where i t  is not: 
1. shared private ownership (for example, a common 
property resource); 
‘2. individual private ownership. 
Shared private ownership differs from open access 
regimes in one important way: the number of individuals 
with access to the benefits of the resource is fixed under the 
first regime, and is unlimited under the second. 
Alternatively, property rights regimes can be classified 
according to whether the resource is physically divided 
into separate parcels or seen as a single unit (Dasgupta, 
1993). Ownership will thus be either separated by temtorial 
boundaries or pooled together and attributed to an entire 
community, which in practice means, in most cases, the 
people living in the resource area. The first case corresponds 
to a territorial ownership regime, the second corresponds to 
a common property ownership regime. The local fishery 
situation quoted above is an example of common property 
resource ownership; family-scale farming is an example of 
territorial ownership. 
Underlying each property rights regime is an enforcement 
mechanism, which is usually provided by a legal code. 
However, a property rights regime may be self-enforcing 
in the sense that the owners’ rights need not be protected 
externally by law or police force but may be enforced by the 
owners themselves, informally, through norms and rules as 
in the case of local commons. Specifications of the rights to 
the services of a natural resource may vary in precision; 
vagueness and incomplete specification of ownership rights 
may give rise to conflict over access to and management of 
the resource. The lack of a clear and enforceable property 
rights regime generates incentives to over-exploit the 
resource base and underinvest in its maintenance. This is 
an important point, sharpened in the proposition below. 
Proposition 1 
A precondition for the successful management of a natural 
resource is a precise relationship between property rights 
and their holders. Vague ownership structures tend to 
generate the consequences of open access regimes. 
A suggestive example is the legislation regarding surface 
waters in Turkey, which, under current laws, are no-man’s 
property, that is, in principle open access resources. In the 
past, courts have allocated water-user rights on the basis of 
priority of appropriation (see FAO, 1993). This type of 
legislative deficiency regarding ownership certainly contri- 
butes to the degradation of surface water quality: with free 
access, users will tend to over-extract water, since they are 
not paying for it. The allocation of user rights on the basis of 
priority of appropriation will not necessarily achieve 
efficient management. An example at the international 
level is the conflict between Turkey, Syria and Iraq 
over user rights to the transboundary rivers Euphrates 
and Tigris; this conflict is a direct consequence of the 
lack of clear, enforceable and accepted rules for the 
extraction of water. If such rules were in place, the parties 
would be able to reach an agreement on the allocation of 
water and a more controlled situation would result (see Bac, 
1996 for a game-theoretic analysis of the interaction 
between nations under incomplete information about 
national objectives). 
The time period for which property rights are granted and 
recognized is another aspect where uncertainty can lead to 
serious maintenance failure. For example, a private enter- 
prise holding the right to manage a forest will abstain from 
investing in planting new trees and upgrading the resource, 
if its expected planning horizon is short, due to the inability 
of the owner (typically the government) to make a credible 
commitment to provide secure tenure. 
Property rights regimes: determinants and. 
implications 
The preceding section has laid down general principles and 
attributes of property rights regimes. The variety of property 
rights regimes for natural resources is immense. What lies 
behind this variety? What are the implications of property 
rights regimes on the yield or surplus of a natural resource? 
These questions are addressed below. 
The propositions highlighted in this section about the 
relationship between property rights regimes and efficiency 
in resource management are closely related to the interested 
parties’ ability to write and enforce comprehensive con- 
tracts. Such contracts are fictitious, ideal instruments to 
organize economic relationships; a complete contract can 
specify an indefinite number of aspects and uses of the 
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resource for the present and the entire future in utmost 
detail. How costly is it, and to what extent is it possible 
(or beneficial) to contract out the services of a piece of 
land or a flow of water? The answer has implications for 
determining the most efficient property rights regime. It 
appears logical to derive the following proposition from 
the illsights of Coase (1937), Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972), and Williamson (1985). 
Proposition 2 
Resources with yields and services for which contracting 
out would be too costly are more efjiciently governed by a 
concentrated ownership regime. 
In a concentrated ownership regime, property rights are 
held by a small number of individuals. Such a regime 
appears to devolve from the relatively high costs of con- 
tracting out the various services of the resource. It may be 
too costly for the owner of a forest (say, the government) to 
lease and regulate separately the rights to harvest the various 
yields of the resource. In such cases, as stipulated by the 
efficiency consequences in proposition 2, , i t  may be 
observed that either the government or a private party exer- 
cises all these rights together. The costs may originate from 
many contextual facts, such as the degree of uncertainty 
involved, the lack of knowledge, and asymmetric informa- 
tion that can potentially generate opportunistic behaviour. 
For instance, the cost of contracting out the right to collect 
mushrooms or fodder may stem from the impossibility of 
monitoring the users for their external effects on other yields 
of the forest. Forests are mostly under full public ownership 
precisely because the externality and enforcement costs 
involved in managing the various services through dispersed 
ownership regimes more than offsets the potential benefits 
(in the form of better technical efficiency, inherent in the 
exercise of property rights under private management). A 
corollary of proposition 2 is that lower costs of contracting 
out various uses of the resource (presumably through 
improved monitoring technologies or legislation) will 
generate inccntives to transform a concentrated ownership 
regime into a dissipated one. 
The main point of the discussion so far is that if complete 
contracts are feasible, that is, if all potential uses of the 
resource can be costlessly specified in contracts and 
enforced, the actual ownershi patterns observed should 
generate efficient management! However, the actual situa- 
tion is far from approximating this ‘ideal’. If the costs of 
writing separate contracts for various aspects and uses of the 
resource are prohibitively high, several factors become 
crucial to an efficient ownership regime. The first of these 
? h i s  statement is a version of the well-known Coase theorem, though 
Coase refers to “costless negotiations” in his formulation instead of the 
notion of complete contracts. The statement is true even in the presence 
of externalities because complete contracts can specify and enforce, 
without cost, the parties’ duties in dealing with externalities. Complete 
contracts would specify with the utmost precision what compensation 
should be paid to the victims and the extent of the externality-generating 
activities. As Coase also points out. under costless negotiations (or 
complete contracts). the allocation of rights (that is, the ownership 
regime) is immaterial to the efficient management of resources. The 
ownership regime matters when contracts are incomplete. The discus- 
sion below should thus be viewed as a second-best analysis, where the 
ownership regime is viewed as a second-best solution to managing 
resources efficiently. 
factors is the distribution of inputs that complement the 
resource in production. The complementary inputs in ques- 
tion are not tradeable, such as resource-specific information 
and local expertise in the cultivation of various crops. 
Efficiency requires the following. 
Proposition 3 
Holders of non-tradeable and non-contractible inputs that 
complement natural resource use should also be the owners 
of the resource. This will provide stronger incentives for 
efjicient management. 
Aside from income distribution concerns, a strong reason 
why local people should hold a wider set of rights over local 
commons is that they hold resource-specific, non-tradeable 
inputs. Jodha (1993) has documented the potential adverse 
effects on local people’s incentives to manage and upgrade 
the commons as new legislation has partially curbed their 
rights, in particular those regarding access. Proposition 3 also 
provides a rationale for ‘community involvement’, that is, 
why communities should be transferred the rights to partici- 
pate in decisions concerning the management of local natural 
resources; this provides the local people with the opportunity 
and incentive to use their resource-specific information. 
The second important determinant of an efficient owner- 
ship regime relates to the investment incentives of the users. 
As with all productive assets, environmental resources 
require maintenance investment. The soil depreciates during 
the process of agricultural production and needs upkeep in 
order to generate a sustainable yield. Here, the property rights 
regime plays an important role, as it affects the owners’ or 
users’ incentives to undertake the optimal level of investment 
into the resource base. The theory of ownership based on 
incomplete contracts stipulates the following proposition. 
Proposition 4 
When it  is too costly to govern private investment decisions 
by coiitrnctital nrrangements (or to enforce them through 
contrcicts or supervision), eficiency requires that the 
investing party be the owner of the resource. 
If long-term contracts that transfer the full benefits of 
investment are too costly to write and enforce, one alter- 
native remains to restore optimal investment incentives: that 
the investing party should own the resource. This will entitle 
the investing party to the full future stream of benefits from 
investment, hence providing incentives to adopt the optimal 
pattern of investment. To recapitulate, these arguments rely 
on the assumption that complete long-term contracts are not 
available, that is, resource users cannot be induced to under- 
take the optimal level of investment through contractual 
arrangements. These arguments also depend on whether 
access to credit is perfect or not. This issue is briefly dis- 
cussed below. Many examples attest to the use, whenever 
possible, of long-term contracts or commitments. One 
instance is in Australian range-lands, where the state leases 
land to private farmers. In certain cases the lease is per- 
petual, but even when it is not, it may apply for decades 
(Pickup and Morton, 1995). In Kenya, the provision of 
security of tenure (which amounts to a long-term commit- 
ment) is reported to have reduced soil erosion due to its 
positive effects on farmers’ investment incentives. 
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Public investment 
An important type of investment to which the statement in 
Proposition 4 does not apply is public invcstment, such as 
the search for and implementation of technological 
improvements in present and future productivity of the 
resource. The training of local people for better resource 
use may also be included in this category. Such technologi- 
cal improvements are not to be seen as private investments 
but public investments par  excellence as, once produced, 
they potentially benefit all. Public investment goods 
are not marketed as are private investment goods such 
as machines and equipment. They generate important 
positive externalities, and should therefore be provided by 
governments or non-profit organizations. 
Owners’ access to credit 
Resource owners’ access to credit is another important 
issue. Poor local people with resource-specific knowledge 
and ability may not hold any property rights-but they 
should, according to proposition 3 above. Even if they 
own the resource that provides them with a living, they 
may lack the investment funds needed to upgrade the 
resource. If capital markets are imperfect (a pervasive con- 
dition in developing countries), they fail to allocate funds to 
many potential uses with high rates of return and thus 
generate overall investment and management inefficiency 





There is room fi)r eflciency-eirliancing government 
action when access to credit by owners or users of a 
resuiirce is impegfect. The government may act as a 
banker and provide credit on reasonable terms. The 
relevant considerations in this regard are the efficiency 
of government credit operations, the availability of irfor- 
mation regarding the borrowers’ needs and incentives, 
and the extent to which public funds crowd out private 
jiinds (the latter are likely to be managed more 
efficiently). 
Large, credible parties have better access to credit. On 
pure efficiency grounds, concentration of the ownership 
of the resource will produce better investment policies 
and management, other things being equal. 
The reasons for the lack of credit, especially to the rural 
poor, are deeply rooted in informational asymmetries 
between potential borrowers and creditors. The latter lack 
relevant information about the expected rate of return 
(which the former possess) and their ability to pay back 
(known as the adverse selection problem) and about the 
care with which the funds will be used (known as the 
moral hazard problem). In these circumstances, lack of col- 
lateral means lack of credit. The government could fill this 
gap as stipulated in item 2 of proposition 5,  but the problem 
of asymmetric information would still remain, especially 
with respect to the users’ ex-post incentives to manage the 
credit. Coping with the ‘moral hazard’ problem is costly 
because it requires monitoring of credit users. However, 
institutional reforms may partially overcome the informa- 
tion problem. An example is the rural credit programme 
initiated by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (see Varian, 
1990 for a theoretical analysis). The bank offers loans to 
groups of small farmers without collateral requirement, but 
the members of a group are made liable for each other’s 
debt. This scheme transfers the burden to monitor credit 
users from the bank to group members by inducing them to 
monitor each other, quite a creative solution to the moral 
hazard problem. As stated in item 2 of proposition 5 ,  groups, 
being a larger entity than individuals, are more credible and 
have access to more credit on better terms. The default rate 
on loans by the Grameen Bank has been impressively low, 
about 2-3%. 
Resource-specif c factors 
Resource-speci fic factors can be grouped together as the 
third important determinant of an efficient ownership 
regime. The most important of these factors are density 
(the average value of harvest per unit area) and predict- 
ability (the inverse of the variance in the value of the 
resource per unit time in the unit area). The consequences 
of these factors in terms of ownership are summarized and 
explained below. 
Proposition 6 
High density and predictability of the resource favour 
private ownership regimes whereas low density andpredict- 
cibility favour common property with dispersed and mobile 
communities (Dasgiipta, 1993). 
Under private ownership, each owner is exposed to a 
yield risk that under common ownership is shared, insuring 
the members to a certain extent. The need for insurance 
against fluctuations in the resource yield increases as pre- 
dictability falls, and vice versa. Thus, other things being 
equal, when the resource yield is predictable and its density 
sufficiently high, a private ownership regime parcelling the 
land among the individuals within a given group will be 
more efficient because i t  copes better with the problems 
of investment and maintenance than does the common 
ownership regime. Common ownership regimes are mostly 
effective in dry lands with a relatively high yield 
uncertainty, while private ownership predominates 
in agricultural areas with stable rainfall and weather 
conditions. 
The above discussion has focused. on efficiency conse- 
quences of property rights regimes, ignoring their income 
distribution consequences. Common property resources, the 
subject of the next section, are mostly observed in rather 
poor communities; these systems generate a more even 
income distribution and are of great importance to the 
poorest within rural populations. 
A close look at common property resources 
In terms of the classification of property rights regimes 
introduced above, common property resources may be gov- 
erned by shared private ownership regimes or government 
ownership regimes with community participation in its 
management. A resource is likely to be commonly owned 
or managed when its territorial division is either not feasible 
(such as the fish in the lake) or very costly to enforce. The 
principal characteristic of these resources is the presence of 
reciprocal externalities. The actions of each user affect the 
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well-being of all other users as, for instance, the grazing of 
one user’s cattle on the common pasture affects the other 
cattle owners. What may be an optimal act from the 
perspective of one individual’s self-interest is mostly not 
optimal from the community’s perspective, as in the case 
of water withdrawals from a common pool, where the 
individually optimal amount will often exceed the socially 
optimal amount. Thus, the crucial determinant of a 
community’s success in managing a common resource 
is its ability to build institutions that internalize the 
externalities and consequences of individual actions. 
Common property resources are not open access resources. 
The owner community, as a whole has strong incentives to 
limit access to its land or forests and enforce its property 
rights against encroachers. However, successful management 
of the resource requires more. Individual members must have 
an incentive to cooperate in achieving communal efficiency, 
each must be induced to take into account the fact that their 
own actions affect the quality of the resource base. Common 
property resources will suffer overexploitation if the mem- 
bers leave it unmonitored. This bad outcome, for which 
Hardin (1968) coins the term ‘tragedy of the commons’, is 
not inevitable. The theory of repeated games, applied to the 
particular context of local commons, provides interesting 
insights. It tells us that, under specific conditions, cooperative 
outcomes can be sustained among a group of self-interested 
agents with conflicting objectives. What are these conditions? 
Proposition 7 
A comniiinity will develop self-enforced ins[i[irtions that 
monitor the use of the common resource, and punish those 
who misuse it, if economic and natural environments are 
sufficiently stable and expected to remain so. Rqid ly  
increasing community populations, technological break- 
throughs, central government interventions and large 
Jiictriations in the prices of harvested products are fiictors 
that contribute to the collapse of a commuriity’s own 
monitoring and enfurcement institutions. 
All the destructive factors mentioned in this proposition 
work their effects through the same intermediate variable: 
the incentives of the individual community members. The 
self-enforcement mechanism collapses and the stage is set 
for the ‘tragedy of the commons’ when the individual’s 
short-term private gains from not conforming to the 
informal rules of communal efficiency exceed his long- 
term private gains from sustained compliance. A rapid 
increase in the population decreases the per-member 
share from the common’s output, and hence decreases the 
individual’s gain in ~omplying.~ Perhaps surprisingly, 
‘Consider the example of a local fishery. For instance, when generation of 
the maximum sustainable yield stipulates a catch rate of 1 ton per 
period, a population of 10 leaves 100 kg per head, whereas a population 
of 100 leaves lOkg per head. In the latter case, an individual fish- 
erman’s sustained gain from conforming with the catch rate of 10 kg is 
much too low; it may even be lower than his short-term private gain 
from extracting the individually optimal amount, say, for example, 
200 kg. It may be worth extracting 200 kg for a while and risking 
punishment by other members of the community instead of conforming 
to the community’s 10-kg-per-head catch rule. It is not hard to guess 
what happens if each fisherman deviates from communally optimnl 
rules of catch. Increases in the population will build up the individual’s 
incentive to deviate from communal rules, which potentially leads to 
the extinction of the fish population and collapse of the local fishery. 
technological breakthroughs such as tractorization may 
also have adverse effects on local commons. As in the 
Jodha (1993) case study, with the introduction of a new 
cropping technology into the local commons, individuals 
become better equipped for extracting larger private short-term 
gains from the resource. Furthermore, individual members will 
be tempted to expropriate the resource, which may in turn 
generate long-lasting intra-communal conflicts. 
Common ownership regimes deal with externality 
problems by establishing institutions that monitor individual 
users and enforce patterns of resource use. They may have a 
cost advantage over private ownership regimes in dealing 
with externalities to the extent that their conflict resolution 
mechanisms are more efficient, equitable and respected. 
Given these institutions and mechanisms, the key issue 
is the robustness of the common ownership regime to 
perturbations in the incentives of individual members (to 
deviate from or conform with the rules and regulations of 
the commons). This issue is further developed below. 
McKean (1993) raises an interesting question with 
respect to commercialization of the harvest of a common 
resource: When are commercial temptations damaging and 
when are they just fine, or even the raison d’etre of a 
common property resource? Empirical evidence is incon- 
clusive. In some cases, an increase in the price of the items 
extracted from the common resource leads to the collapse of 
the regime, whereas in other cases, such as coastal fisheries, 
the regime copes fairly well with increases in the users’ 
temptations to over-extract the common resource. The 
theory of repeated games applied to the context of a local 
common resource provides a very useful guide to the 
answer. The answer suggested by the theory hinges on the 
comparison between two choices that the individual has, 
each choice being associated with a stream of benefits. In 
deciding whether to act cooperatively, a community 
member will weigh the long-term yields of cooperation 
against the short-term benefits of cheating, that is, acting 
according to his self-interest, ignoring the rest of the 
community. A permanent increase in the prices of the 
harvested items will increase both benefit streams, but 
relatively more so the benefits from sustained cooperation 
i f  the community members are ‘patient’ enough, that is, if 
they do not discount future benefits heavily. In relatively 
poor communities whose members are preoccupied by short- 
term survival needs, the same increase in the prices of 
harvested items may, through the strong short-term temptation 
it imposes on the members, lead to the collapse of cooperative 
management. Another important consideration is whether the 
price increases are perceived as temporary or permanent, as the 
members will be more tempted to deviate from communal 
rules of resource use if prices are high only temporarily. 
The transformation of common property resources into 
(non-shared) private properties may result in serious 
problems relating to their efficient management, as the 
new owners may fail to internalize the negative external 
effects of their activities. The empirical study produced by 
Jodha (1986) provides useful insights into the why and how 
of the collapse of local commons. Jodha’s study covers dry- 
land commons in India over a period of 20 years. During 
that period, he observed declines in the geographical areas 
of the common property resource, ranging from 26 to 63% 
partly through privatization. An increased population, 
coupled with new technologies such as tractors, made it 
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profitable to expropriate land for cropping. The outcome 
was gradual desertification. In one instance, it was a 
government land reform in the concerned area that triggered 
the desertification process; the reform did not include any 
investment into improving the productivity of the land base. 
Privatization of forest lands without enforcement of appro- 
priate laws may also have fatal consequences. Binswanger 
(1989) reports a case from Brazil, where the government’s 
policy of reducing taxes on agricultural income to zero has 
induced the relatively wealthy to acquire forest land, which 
is then deforested for cropping. The policy was a complete 
failure; it led to the destruction of marginal forest lands, 
rendered destitute the rural poor who depended on the forest, 
and worsened the income distribution. A desirable aspect of 
the common property regime is its relatively fair income 
distribution consequences. Common property resources also 
constitute a not negligible source of income for the poorest in 
rural communities. These two aspects are often neglected 
when public policies targeting local commons are designed. 
The following proposition concludes this section and the 
article. 
Proposition 8 
Before designing cin intervention with respect to a natural 
resource. it is of vital importance for policymakers to ascer- 
tain whether or not the resoiirce is corninon property and 
whether or not it is currently rncinaged by ajiinctioning sey- 
enforcement regime. Ifsiich is the case. any policy interven- 
tion may be counterproductive. 
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